An Agenda of International security and Intelligence Studies: Post 9/11

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Abstract: The terrorist attacks at New York, London and Madrid have changed the global landscape for international security and intelligence services. More importantly, The deadliest terrorist attack of 9/11 has provided the foundation to convert traditional security measures into transnational dimension. This mega incident has reshaped the perception of international community for threats of terrorism. Thus, after the perceived failure of intelligence services, it was necessitated that both intelligence and security management agencies should integrate their intelligence skills and form co-ordination for establishing effective mechanism on counter terrorism. The current research is aimed at making a review of the international collective efforts on combating terrorism after the mega terrorist attack of 9/11. At has evaluated the overall weaknesses of the system of global security and intelligence sharing.

I.   INTRODUCTION

Terrorism has become an international phenomenon ever since the rise of conflict and war. However, a serious attention by researchers has paid to it during last three decades after the emergence of numerous militant organizations (Duyvesteyn, 2004). More importantly, the deadliest attack of 9/11 has resulted in opening of new mechanism for understanding and management of terrorism. This single event has signaled the arrival of super terrorism in the world and has forced the world community to establish new rules for the international security and intelligence sharing. It was argued post 9/11 that the terrorism is an international threat and individual efforts cannot combat it. Though, initially United States was deemed to be the only target of terrorists but with the passage of time, all the nations supporting United States have become the current and potential targets of such terrorist organizations (Benjamin, 2003). Thus, it is imperative for all the stakeholders to work together on co-operative basis in order to address the issue of international security.

Since last decade, the phenomenon of common security has evolved in such a way that security is now focused as a preventive measure rather than a deterrence approach (Albert et al, 2001). Researchers have devised a co-operative security theory which requires that a strategic framework should be established around countries that are connected with each other either for political, economic or for defense co-operation. One of the key features of co-operative security theory is that it must be based on common interests of the nations involved. Moreover, at international and multilateral levels, co-operative security arrangement is the only way to achieve 'mandate on war on terror' (Adamson, 2006).

This theory was developed post 9/11 in different steps. First of all, the response to 9/11 in order to counter terrorism at both individual and collective basis was adopted which included the passing of legislation, establishment of security committees, creation of agencies and revision of the existing legislations. Initially, the government of United States adopted the policy of "go alone" for self defense (Cronin, 2003). However, with the gaining of momentum in the war against terrorism, the government, in order to counter multilateral terrorism, needed co-operation and a common mechanism.

Global collective efforts against war on terror:

Globalization is the most important product in transforming the international security management practices. It has led to reduce the capacity of countries to combat terrorism individually. After the mega attack of 9/11 on New York, all of the established global bodies necessitated the joint efforts against terrorism (Tadjbakhsh et al, 2006). 9/11 attack served as a wakeup call for the international community as the terrorists are the biggest threat to both civilian and armed forces equally (McGeary, 2002). This event revealed the aim of terrorists as maximum damage to lives and properties of the nations. The defense budgets of international community were increased significantly after this attack. Moreover, the budgets are not entirely spent on

domestic security and intelligence services like America is spending nearly half in the countries like Afghanistan and Iraq (Karmon, 2002). These are aimed at improving the overall intelligence services, tracking of the assets of terrorist organizations and establishing of the close linkages with other countries for the purpose of co-operation on such issues.

After only a couple of weeks of this attack, the International Security Council passed an anti terrorism resolution1373 (2001) unanimously which not only condemned this mega attack but urged all the member states for the establishment of funds to counter terrorism and to freeze the assets of those nations which facilitate or fund or provide safe heavens to terrorists. It was held that such countries will also be prosecuted for entertaining culprits in any way. Moreover, all the member states were required to co-operate in order to counter terrorism. In this regard, the member countries were asked to share information on the movement or actions of the terrorists, their forged documents, their possession of weapons for mass destruction. On the other hand, when it comes to providing shelters to refugees, the state supposed to provide such shelter must ensure that the seekers are not involved in any terrorist activities. During this meeting, a Counter Terrorism Committee (CTC) of the 15 member states was also established which was given the authority to ensure the implementation of the resolution among all member states and to promote the exchange of information and co-operation at both national and international level.

Soon after the forming of this resolution, the South Asian countries expressed their full support to United States for combating terrorism. 10 states from this region formed Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) which agreed to stop co-operation and funding to terrorist organizations and share intelligence services. The Asia Pacific Economic Co-operation (APEC) which consists of 21 member states, also established Counter Terrorism Task Force (CTTF) collectively and a Counter Terrorism Action Plan individually to fight against terrorism. All of the countries belonging to this region revised and strengthened their laws related to anti-terrorism. The Southeast Asian countries including Indonesia, Malaysia and Philippine which were already facing resistance from terrorists, formed partnerships for unified understanding and fighting against this mounting issue. So, a new type of kinship was observed among the Southeast countries after the event of 9/11 (Mackinlay, 2002). All of the countries in the region including: China, Japan, Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, India, Japan, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand and others not only condemn the event strongly but offered international coalition to fight against terrorism (MacFarlane, 2006).

On September 12, 2001, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) hold an emergency meeting and concluded that such a terrorist attack is an attack on all the ally forces and it must be handled collectively (Thakur et al, 2004). Thus, all of NATO allies ultimately, directed their forces to Afghanistan in order to assist United States and to counter terrorism. On the other hand, NATO forces established close relationships with EU (European Union) in order to better address the terrorist threats. Moreover, NATO is also commanding the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). The UNO which has always remained active against war on terrorism, after the attack of 9/11, it has established committees in order to promote collective actions for combating transnational terrorism (den Boer and Monar, 2002).

EU which is one of the most important partner of global efforts against war on terror, reacted decisively and quickly to terrorist challenges posed by the attack of 9/11. It shortly prepared various policy proposals along with signing a broad agreement to become part of the international coalition against war on terror (Paris, 2001). Thus, EU, which had a poor track record in past, came up with quite an opposite response on security issues. The UK-US liaison for sharing security relations is remarkably enduring and is also considered among the best examples of effective international intelligence sharing services (Argomaniz, 2009; Behr and Berger, 2009). On the other hand, the African continent, which has wider disparities in terms of political and economic matters was united on the war on terror and it formed to co-ordinate and integrate information and a collective mechanism to counter terrorism (Mitsilegas, 2003).

In parallel to military support to counter terrorism at international level, the relevant information and intelligence sharing is also vital. Consequently, after the incident of 9/11, the international intelligence and law enforcement efforts were increased and strengthened (Freedman, 2002). In this regard, the security of diplomatic places including those of US embassies was enhanced in all countries.

The event of 9/11 greatly influenced the global politics, privacy of citizens and international security (Cilluffo and Rankin, 2002). Before the occurrence of the event the intelligence services were not considered to be so important and centre of public interest. As the event occurred due to total failure of the intelligence services which resulted in huge damage to the country, the consequences of which are even spread on the decades to come (Glen, 2004). The new enmity emerged from this attack has necessitated the world's intelligence services to concentrate on four main areas: to pay equal attention on both national and international actors, to outline the broadened privileges granted for improving intelligence services after the attack, to enhance the level of co-ordination faster enough to issue alarming timely for the possible threat and finally to consider the co-operation for intelligence sharing at international level as inevitable to survive (Dickey, 2004). Thus, right after the event, major changes occurred not only to American intelligence services but to entire

intelligence operations at global level and it is rightly believed that if it had not been the event of 9/11, the intelligence services could not get the required importance (Cillier, 2003).

In the aftermath of 9/11, the weaknesses in the information sharing proved to be the most important contributing factors for states failure to prevent attacks of the terrorists. Thus, many countries have established their information sharing and diffusion centers which are largely supposed to exchange information on terrorist networks and their activities with each other (Dittmer, 2002). After the attack, US formed new "Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004" which required the closer co-ordination between all international intelligence services. Thus, today, the US global intelligence services include a total of 16 agencies and services. These agencies were formally working independently prior to 9/11, however, after the event, they are now supposed to work completely in co-ordination of each other under the command of Director of National Intelligence (Goredema, 2003).

Ultimate Weaknesses in the global agenda of security and Intelligence sharing:
However, after 15 years, it has been realized that the US strategy to combat terrorism has proved a little success in protecting the country from threat of terrorism. The most pertinent reason of failure is the aggressive strategy to deal with the issue through military invasion. the heavy budget spending of nearly $4.79 trillion from 2001-2017 for war on terror has clearly outweighed the benefits achieved. The lessons learnt so far, require international community especially United States to change the approach for combating terrorism. On the other hand, the problems in international security and intelligence sharing is also problematic because of the networked world which has become an ideal territory for religious terrorism. Secondly, the developed countries have their own notion of security and intelligence sharing which is largely done to protect their own respective assets (Elliott, 2002). Thus, information sharing of high grade is difficult but it is done on selective as well as bilateral basis (Aldrich, n.d). So, there is need to integrate a much developed and improved conceptual framework for information sharing. It is because primary concern of the terrorists does not lay in weak national structure but on weak intelligence sharing.

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